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impacts by region  
 
 
Structured Abstract 
 
Purpose: 
 
The aim is to illustrate how differing policy instruments linked to FDI into China may 
have very different impacts. The paper looks at: patterns of FDI across China and 
other key, emerging nations; FDI patterns across the three declared, developmental 
regions of the PRC; and the effectiveness of four of the PRC government‟s policy 
measures aimed at promoting FDI, and highlights the unexpectedly differing 
outcomes which can emerge from those incentives.  
 
Design: 
 
The initial patterns draw on published data of the relevant countries and of the 
China‟s three designated development regions. The problem of differing, and 
unexpected, impacts is examined by means of four mini-cases, drawing on previously 
published work and featuring a number of locations. 
 
Findings: 
 
China is near the top of the list of FDI recipients but its relative success compared 
with other developing economies is more modest. FDI into China is heavily skewed in 
favour of the richest east region, the poor west being the weakest attractor. The mini-
cases show how the same policy can have very different and sometimes unintended 
outcomes in different areas. A recurring theme is the existence of common, systemic 
problems for investors, which may be seen as „grit‟ in China‟s economic system. 
 
Practical implications: 
 
The PRC government should reflect on what its investment policies may actually 
deliver as well as their initial intent and to seek to ensure consistent implementation 
across the country. 
 
Originality: 
 
The originality of the work lies in the interpretation of existing information: the 
location of „hidden truths‟. 
 
 
Keywords: FDI, regions, PRC, incentive policies, outcomes 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
China, and its more recent, emergent economy rival, India, have become major 
magnets for FDI in recent years, prior to the sudden dip of the new (2008/9) global 
recession, which has led to sharply adjusted, global patterns of FDI flows in 2009. 
China has, over the past 30 years, put in place a range of measures which may be seen 
as potential incentives to foreign investors, and indeed to domestic investors too, at 
both national level and „provincial‟ level. [The term is shown in parentheses since it is 
used to include Autonomous Regions and major Municipalities, such as Beijing, 
which have reporting lines similar to those for provinces.] One of the interesting 
things to emerge from this context is that some very different outcomes can be 
observed albeit the nominal incentives may be very similar. 
 
This paper looks first at patterns of FDI across a small set of key, emerging nations, 
including China and  India  (section two) and across the three declared, developmental 
regions of the PRC – east, central and west (section three). The focus of the paper 
then switches, in the fourth section, to the effectiveness of and varied impacts across 
regions of attempted, governmental measures. Four different policy measures are 
examined in turn: viz, creation of specialist zones; establishment of wider geographic, 
„development‟ regions; the effectiveness of Science and Technology Industry Parks 
(STIPs) as technology transfer agents; and the He Xie or harmony policy in the 
eleventh five year plan. In section five, we examine the kind of systemic problems 
commonly found in the PRC in the governance frameworks which apply to 
  5 
businesses, both design problems, such as weakly drafted legislation, and 
operationally observable issues which may have some element of cultural rootedness.  
 
FDI TRENDS GLOBALLY AND IN BIC 
 
Table 1 below shows the strong upward trend in global FDI over the six year period 
prior to 2009. Interestingly, the developing economies‟ FDI receipts grew less quickly 
than the world‟s and hence by extension even less quickly than developed economy 
receipts.  
 
Looking at the nominated countries‟ data separately shows just how volatile flows can 
be for a country such as the UK - used here as a developed economy benchmark -
where the financial sector accounts for a significant proportion of the flows. Inflows 
for China, India and Brazil, three parts of the so-called BRIC, or BIC, all grew 
strongly in the period 2004 to 2008 but India markedly faster than China. This last 
point of course reflects the fact that China‟s modernisation and economic growth 
began some 13 years or more before India‟s, starting points being 1978 (the 
establishment of the „Open Door Policy‟) in China and 1991 for India. In the last year, 
prior to the general slowdown seen in 2009, India came forward most strongly of the 
troika, unsurprising in the long term picture: they have further to go having come 
from a low base. Nevertheless, even they looked set to go backwards early in 2009, 
with the Indian financial press reporting (financial express.com), in February 2009, 
that the figure booked for that month was less than one third that for the same period 
in 2008. However, by the end of April, renewed optimism for India was being shown 
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with Reuters (24 April 2009) predicting a modest gain to $40bn for the period April 
2009-March 2010.  
 
 
Table 1 - Global Inward FDI Flow Trends (in $bn) 
 
 
Year    2003    2004     2005     2006     2007    2008 
World     561.1       717.7      958.7    1411     1833.3   1449.1 
Developing  
Economies 
   180.1    283.6 
   
    316.4    413      499.8     519.8 
 Average 
1990/2000 
   2004     2005     2006     2007    2008 
UK    40.3       56.0      177.9      148.2    224.0     109.4 
Brazil    12.0      18.1       15.1       18.8      34.6      41.7 
India      1.7       5.8         7.6       19.7       23.0      36.7 
China     30.1     60.6       72.4       72.7      83.5         92.4 
 
Source: Created by the author using data from WIRs, UNCTAD; the data released by mid-2009 are 
as shown; but in the final 2009 WIR the global figure had become $1697.4bn and the developing 
countries figure $620.7bn 
 
 
UNCTAD meanwhile, in a press release of 19
th
 January 2009, UNCTAD (2009), 
noted the 21 percent fall globally in FDI flows in 2008 (as shown in the first data row 
of Table 1 but, using the revised datum in the footnote, the fall is measured at a more 
modest 7.4 percent) and predicted worse would ensue in 2009. All of this is of course 
bad news for the global economy generally but most especially for countries such as 
China, and probably India too, where the inflow of FDI has been a key driver of 
growth, and hence modernization, in the country over the past decade, see e.g. Foster 
and Song (2009). [More generally, a recent issue of World Economy (2006) focused 
on the issue of which of FDI and GDP actually drives or causes the other in 
developing economies. Evidence presented suggests that, in line with the findings of 
Foster and Song, the major linkage is that FDI causes growth in GDP, see the papers 
by Chowdhury and Mavrotas, pp.9-19, and Hansen and Rand, pp.21-41.] China, and 
India, should be able to continue to grow their economies, even with weaker FDI 
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inflows, not least because of the inherent, untapped domestic economy delivered by 
prior cumulative growth, and in China‟s case huge, financial reserves, but the process 
will be slower. This is precisely what the overall picture has been in India, as 
compared to China, post 1991. However, as Smith (2008, p92) writes: “For some 
[Indians], the slow but steady approach was preferable; the Indian elephant may have 
chosen to travel at a gentler pace than its great rival, China, but the race would be a 
long one, and who [is] to say that India „s [pace will] not be more sustainable in the 
long run.”  
 
Smith later predicts (p229) that, given various assumptions, China may have a per 
capita National Income around two thirds of current US levels by 2050, with Indians 
in turn enjoying a level two thirds that of their Chinese brothers. Seen from one angle, 
a disappointment 40 years on from now but the gap will have closed markedly if those 
projections are right. As Table 2 below shows, current (2008) levels of GNI per capita 
for Indians are less than half (46 percent) the per capita income of the Chinese. 
Arguably the more important statistic, if correct however, will be the Chinese having 
67% of the per capita income of the Americans and Indians 45% of that US income. 
These numbers compare very favourably with the current ordered pair of just (4.5%, 
1.8%).  
 
Table 2 also shows clearly where India and China are on the modernization curve for 
which the percentage of urban dwellers is a fair proxy. Brazil at this point in time still 
provides a more tangible, immediate target for India and China than developed 
countries such as the UK or the USA, both in terms of income per capita (Table 2) 
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and  FDI per capita (Table 3), which will be one of the twin motors of future growth 
in these countries. 
 
Table 2 - Country Biodata: BIC and Comparators (2008) 
 
 
Country Population 
(m) 
Life Exptcy 
(yrs) 
Urban % GNI ($bn) GNI/Cap 
($k) 
Brazil     190     72.24     84     892.6   4.7 
China   1322     72.88     40.5   2621   2.0 
India   1130     68.59     28.7     909.1   0.82 
Thailand       65     72.55     33     193.7   3.05 
UK       60.8     78.7     90   2455.7 40.6 
USA     301     78     81 13386.9  44.7 
 
Source: Created by the author using data from Whitaker‟s Almanack, 2009 
 
 
Table 3 - Per Capita Inbound FDI for BIC and the UK ($ per capita) 
 
 
            \ Year 
Country  
   2004     2005     2006     2007     2008 
UK       921     2926      2438     3684     1799 
Brazil      95.2           79.5        98.9      182.1       219.4 
India         5.2          6.7        17.4          20.4        32.5 
China      45.8        54.8        55.0         63.1        69.6 
 
Source: Created by the author using data from WIRs, UNCTAD; Whitaker‟s Almanack, 2009 
 
 
We can also see very clearly from Table 3 just how far ahead of China Brazil is in 
terms of FDI per capita flows, despite China having the clear lead amongst 
developing economies in aggregate FDI inflows, more than double Brazil‟s figures 
throughout the recorded period (see Table 1). Aggregate numbers are important 
because, once large enough, they allow the development of some sort of scale 
investments in the chosen country, or area within, but the per capita data illustrate 
vividly just how far even the more successful developing countries still have to go to 
achieve their implicit goal of parity of living standards with the „rich west‟.  
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PATTERNS OF FDI ACROSS CHINA’S REGIONS 
 
In 2000, the PRC government confirmed its „Go West Strategy‟ recognizing that 
stability and harmony within China would be initially difficult and progressively 
harder to maintain if they continued to oversee an increase in national wealth which 
was very skewed in its distribution, see for example Goodman (2004). The eastern 
coastal strip in particular, which includes the key cities of Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou, as well as the old capital of Nanjing, Tianjin, Shenyang and Hangzhou, 
has become wealthy and other areas have lagged behind, especially parts of the far 
west. One could say, with the benefit of hindsight by mid-2009, that the disorder seen 
in preceding months in Tibet and Xinjiang have been evidence of precisely the kind of 
events „Beijing man‟ feared. To be sure there are political issues in those autonomous 
regions way beyond the prosaics of the distribution of national income but not getting 
one‟s share of the national wealth cake also causes disgruntlement.    
 
There is an official allocation of provinces, autonomous regions and „province status‟ 
(or key) municipalities to three regions (East, Central and West), relative to which 
„Go West‟ is to be understood. In terms of the affluence of the inhabitants, the 
regions, in order, can be thought of as rich, moderate income and poor.  The 
classification is not entirely true to the country‟s geography but rather reflects the kind 
of economic manipulation attempted in the Go West policy. The allocation is: 
 
East: Beijing*, Tianjin*, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai*, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan 
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Central: Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan 
  
West: Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Sichuan, Chongqing*, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, 
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Tibet 
(* denotes a key municipality) 
 
Table 4 below demonstrates vividly the skew involved in FDI attraction, much more 
even than the disparity in GDP (/per capita), this despite the fact that Sichuan 
province and Chongqing municipality lie in the western region. In fact, Sichuan 
Province and Chongqing Municipality accounted for very nearly half of the realized 
FDI in the whole Western Region in 2008, up from figures between 30 and 40 percent 
for all years from 2003 to 2007, showing just how weak the rest of the region was as 
an FDI-attractor. 
  
Table 4 - Cumulative FDI in the Defined Regions of China to 2008 
 
   US$bn  US$bn  
Region 
No. of 
projects 
to 2002 Share % 
Realized 
FDI Value 
to 2002 Share % 
Realized 
FDI Value 
to 2008 Share % 
East 345,054 81% 385.5 86% 832.7 83% 
Central 49,443 12% 39.7 9% 116.4 12% 
West 29,699 7% 22.8 5% 58.8 6% 
Total 424,196 100% 448.0 100% 1007.8 100% 
 
Source: Created by the author using data from China Statistical Yearbooks and Provincial Statistical 
Yearbooks (various issues) 
 
The table in Appendix 2, reliability caveat therewith notwithstanding, gives a clear 
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elaboration of the picture in Table 4. The East still dominates the PRC‟s acquisition of 
FDI although the final two columns show that there has been some slight proportionate 
movement to the Centre and the West over the last four years data available: but one 
stresses „slight‟. In that sense, the „Go West‟ policy has had limited success thus far, as 
seen through the FDI-lens. Paradoxically, the even more pronounced skew within the 
West in 2008, noted above,  just may be evidence of some small success in the Go 
West policy: the success would be the attraction of FDI to the West and the irony 
(hence paradox) being that it was attracted to one of the already richer bits of that 
poorer region.  
 
CHINA GROWTH-LINKED POLICIES AND EVIDENTIAL VIGNETTES AT 
NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS 
 
We can identify a number of policies or schemes by means of which it was hoped to 
boost, develop and grow the Chinese economy since 1978. The first and perhaps most 
obvious was the very fact of welcoming foreign investment at all post-1978 with the 
declaration of the Open-Door Policy. As noted before, this has helped to boost the 
PRC economy but the impact has been heavily skewed in terms of its geographical 
impact, with the knowledge, and active connivance, of the Beijing government. This in 
turn raises its own problems, now being addressed somewhat, see the previous section  
and in what follows. 
 
The remainder of this section looks at a number of policies with both national and 
provincial focus, to see how the same nominal, central policies may play out with 
differing effects across a country as vast and diverse as China. 
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Creation of Specialist Zones 
One particular policy to aid industrial development has been the designation of various 
specialised “zones”, which helped to create industry (specialist) clusters (see e.g. 
Porter, 1998 and 2000) and conferred benefits on their tenants. The first and best 
known were the Special Economic Zones (firstly four: Shenzhen (the „new Hong Kong 
in China‟), Zhuhai, Shantou - all in Guangdong - and Xiamen (in Fujian), to which a 
fifth, Hainan, was later added), all located in the South East bar Hainan. In addition, by 
1995 there were other zones, including Free Trade Zones (free-ports); coastal, “open 
cities”; Economic and Trade Development Zones; New/High-Tech Industrial 
Development Zones (HTIDZs); and finally, the slightly broader reality which is the 
Pudong New Area, or industrial East Shanghai, see e.g. Pu and Foster (1996) 
 
Typically, these zones provide certain benefits both of infrastructure and tax/customs 
regime inter alia. SEZs, specifically, benefited from autonomy in regard to investment 
policy and infrastructure development; import licence exemptions; and tax breaks, see 
e.g. Tseng and Zebregs (2003). For many years the corporate income tax rate (what we 
would call corporation tax) for their foreign invested enterprises (FIEs), along with the 
rate for hi-tech FIEs in HTIDZs, was no more than 15% compared with the national 
figure of 33%. Abolition of the 15% rate had been „rumoured to be imminent‟ over 
almost a decade, but there was finally a change via the PRC Enterprise Income Tax 
Law (2007), passed on 16
th
 March 2007, to a new, unified national rate of corporation 
tax of 25%, with effect from 1
st
 January 2008. However, even then, as Zhao and Yuan 
(2007) note, there can still be some exemptions, e.g. the SEZs, the Pudong New Area, 
the Western Development Region and for hi-tech entities so classified, with „hi-tech‟ 
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undefined!  
 
And within those last two sentences lies one of China‟s greatest governance issues, 
which in turn has two aspects. Namely, the „flexibility‟ legitimately built in to much 
regulation, with a consequent, genuine need for interpretation and the exercise of 
interpretation which may be less than legitimate. This is discussed further in section 5.   
 
So far so good but are these zones successful at all and similarly so across their 
geographic distribution? The SEZs have, in the eyes of most, worked to some extent at 
least, although not uniformly so – Hainan may be thought less successful for example. 
The success there has been in the SEZs has been in no small measure because of the 
investments there from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Shenzhen is a dramatic and visible 
success: it looks pretty much what it was intended to be, a throbbing, new Hong Kong 
in mainland China. [Although the politics are that Hong Kong is now part of the PRC, 
its status, along with Macau, as a Special Administrative Region (SAR), with its own 
different legal system to run until 2047, means that it is effectively „outside China‟. It 
can be thought of as an overseas colony, which is still an entrepôt with very low tax 
rates and, crucially top-drawer recognition from the main trading blocs of the world.] 
 
Similarly HTIDZs have had a good measure of success in terms of simply providing a 
clustering focus for hi-tech industries (although not necessarily in other important 
respects, see section 4.3) and are to be found in both Nanjing, capital of Jiangsu 
Province, and Shanghai, the totem head of the Yangtze Delta. Both municipalities are 
home to many FIEs but, as Foster and Wang (2007) explain, Nanjing was disappointed 
by its relative lack of success compared to Shanghai and the smaller (but better foreign 
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invested) Suzhou: the FDI per capita inflows to the three cities back in 2002 were 
respectively ($268, $375, $830). While those in poorer parts of China would probably 
have been delighted with that flow-rate, Nanjing was starting to actively initiate a 
debate on how to improve its presence as an FDI-attractor. Foster and Wang identified 
several potential reasons for Nanjing‟s relative failure. These included: 
 Failure to focus sufficiently on its principal, pillar industries;  
 Unwillingness to see its position as part of Greater Shanghai to be a key 
advantage to be leveraged*; 
 Lack of professionalism in its PR; and 
 Failure, along with most other parts of China, to deliver genuine transparency 
for FIEs. 
[* It was suggested that this could in part be usefully visualised by using the 
nested-double diamond they proposed: the nested diamond is illustrated in 
Appendix 1] 
 
Thus we see that even within successful, or rich, parts of China, the same policies can 
have differential impacts.  
 
Wider Geographic Regions beyond  focussed Zones 
A more recent and geographically more broad-brush, zonal-type policy is exemplified 
by the creation of the Pan Pearl River Delta (PPRD) Region. The early focus around 
Guangdong in particular was a function of the political reality of the 1970s and 1980s. 
The „Taiwan Issue‟ was a major problem; the Hong Kong problem, as perceived by 
Beijing, was in the process of solution but not fully so until 1997; and much of the 
world, including crucially the USA, was cautious about China and its motives. Against 
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this background, with its conduit to the west through Hong Kong, Guangdong was a 
pragmatic location for a new export oriented growth phase, industrially possible and 
politically feasible because of Hong Kong‟s external status as a British Colony and 
freeport, see Overholt (1993).  The PPRD Region was set up under the CEPA (Closer 
Economic Partnership Arrangement) in July 2003. It is an “economic super-zone”, 
comprising the nine southernmost provinces of the PRC plus its two SARs (Hong 
Kong and Macau); hence sometimes known also as “9+2”. It sought to bring together 
the already more developed Guangdong, its developed neighbouring SARs and some 
less developed provinces such as Guizhou, Yunnan and the autonomous region (AR) 
of Guangxi to provide a mutually self supporting area capable of new growth. 
 
Until the advent of policies such as the creation of PPRD and the establishment of the 
„Go West‟ policy, it could be argued that there had been a tendency for industrial 
development to be based on a one size for all approach, to modify the well known 
saying. So the poorer South West part of the South, rather than the rich South East 
began to get more consideration. Within the far-South West, Guangxi AR is the main 
geographical feature. It is bigger by area than Guangdong and has 60 percent the 
population at just under 50m but on the economic indicators has barely one-fifth the 
GDP and FDI of less than 5 percent that of Guangdong. But it is not all bad news. 
Guangxi is sometimes described as “Facing South East Asia with the Great South West 
of China Behind”, because of its geographic setting, see Foster and Song (2009). It has 
a border with Vietnam in its south-west quadrant and is close to Hong Kong and 
Macau, hanging off Guangdong, as they do. In other words it has a strategic location 
and one whereby this autonomous region could be made into the trading gateway for 
most of the West region‟s industrial exports and imports.    
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Another benefit is that it is rich in natural resources including: water for hydro-power; 
oil and gas; minerals (89 varieties); one of the key forest areas in southern China; and, 
of course, it‟s hitherto fairly unspoilt sea-side, for details see Song (2004). 
 
With spectacular (internal) landscapes and scenery, good climate, and low pollution, 
Guangxi has begun to develop as a centre for (mainly internal) tourism and could have 
external potential with good planning. The autonomous region offers then a prime 
example of an area which could still be developed but in an eco-friendly fashion. 
Forests could be managed sustainably; minerals could be extracted in as eco-friendly a 
fashion as may be technically feasible; and the coastal region could, with sensible 
planning, be developed in a non-polluting fashion (e.g. only build luxury, beachside 
hotels in tandem with effluent treatment plants, maintaining the clear blue waters as 
the advantage they are at present). 
 
In short, PPRD is at once both an example of the differences still visible from the same 
policy within the southern part of the country and on the other hand an exemplar of the 
move to try to help the less advantaged areas, in this case by linking them with the 
success story which is Guangdong with its three SEZs and the two SARs.  
 
 Science and Technology Industry Parks – has Technology transferred? 
Science and Technology Industry Parks (STIPs, another name for HTIDZs) and 
university science parks include in their aims specifically delivering useful applied 
research and innovation by developing a creative nexus between universities and their 
adjacent or nearby STIPs, and more generally promoting hi-tech industry. The idea 
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like science parks elsewhere, such as in the UK, was basically to set up an area which 
includes incubator units close to powerful, research-led universities, whereby scientists 
could interact with entrepreneurs to deliver a new innovatory product, and/or process, 
stream, or indeed take forward their own ideas and become entrepreneurs in their own 
right. Because of the concentration of many of the country‟s leading research 
universities in Beijing and Shanghai, this means that there are rather more STIPs in 
those two province status municipalities than elsewhere. But have they worked, has the 
policy been uniformly effective?    
 
In this case, it is of course clear that many of the new units will be domestic entities 
but there is no bar in principle to FIEs locating in STIPs and there are examples of this 
phenomenon, see e.g. Watkins-Mathys and Foster (2006) and Cao (2009). 
 
The short answer to our question is „only partly‟ and the main, missing ingredients to 
make the knowledge transfer work, hence delivering commercialised innovations, are 
entrepreneurship and management skills. As Watkins-Mathys and Foster (2006) 
reported: “We found that innovation capability, locational factors such as being located 
in a regional industry cluster (in or outside STIPS), guanxi and networking 
opportunities, entrepreneurial skills, including international business experience, as 
well as access to more financial sources and capital for developing the business are 
more important than the government‟s preferential policies. Nevertheless, many of the 
government‟s STIPs are located in China‟s industrial agglomerations, which have been 
proven to increase export performance and enhance a firm‟s innovation capability.” 
 
During the fieldwork for that research, the authors interviewed entrepreneurs located 
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outside as well as inside STIPs. One interviewee who had indeed chosen not to locate 
in a STIP is quoted as saying: (p267): “More important than having tax incentives and 
reduced rents is to have a good business idea and a well worked out business plan.” 
Furthermore, the location he had chosen, in Beijing, did not preclude networking with 
Beijing‟s universities and recruiting well-qualified interns and graduates from them.  
 
Cao‟s (2009) more recent work, specifically about SMEs in the IT-software sector, 
confirms the „missing link‟ of entrepreneurial spirit and also highlights the paucity of 
venture capital in China and the difficulty for SMEs to gain any sort of long-term 
financing from the traditional banking sector. Thus we could say that the STIP/science 
park model could work but only if all contextual factors are truly in place. Incentives, 
tax-breaks for example, while other necessary conditions for success are absent, will 
not deliver the hoped for outcomes. 
 
Building a ‘Harmonious Society’ 
Another recent policy of the central government, announced in the eleventh Five-Year 
Plan in 1998, is the objective „to build a harmonious society‟, or to use another phrase 
to operate a He Xie (or harmony) policy. This is an attempt to deal with the perceived, 
and indeed real, inter-provincial unfairnesses that the arguably unfettered, headlong 
drive for quick economic gain left in its wake as the 21
st
 century dawned. As Cao et al 
(2008) explain, by the close of the 20
th
 century, the new industrial imperative was to 
upgrade the country‟s industrial structure to allow the achievement of sustainable 
development and growth. As part of that, there were measures to, (p279-80), “hasten 
the introduction and development of High-tech industrial clusters such as 
biotechnology, microelectronics, semi-conductors and medicine.” As this happens or 
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would happen on the one hand, what was to be done to assuage the worries of those 
based in areas with declining clusters, often centred on older technology, dirty 
industries, e.g. Shanxi with its coal (energy), heavy industries and chemicals, all rooted 
in its indigenous natural resources?  
 
The problems of places such as Shanxi can crudely be described as a highly focussed 
„resource rape‟ of extractive materials necessary to underpin the first phase of the post-
Mao industrial resurgence. The problem was and is that there was no immediate Plan B 
in place when things began to tail off somewhat. Not only that, but there had been a 
brain drain from Shanxi, with the result that one of the key necessities for a more 
knowledge based, new industrial phase was lacking, viz, large quantities of trained 
intellectual firepower. While Shanxi produced the coal to deliver power, the Beijing 
government controlled its price to help make manufacturing industry profitable and 
able to export. Thus a paradox occurred: the country got rich but the province lagged 
further and further behind in real income terms. Only post 2003, with new export 
markets for coal products and sharply increased prices did that income even begin to 
catch up with the rest of the country and there was little, non-extractive, higher 
knowledge component development and the brain drain was in flow. 
 
Cao et al (2008) propose that application of so-called He Xie Management Theory 
could provide the framework for a solution in the case of Shanxi. While He Xie as a 
phrase may translate broadly as „harmony‟, they take the two characters and work with 
them separately to explain how the theory might help. He can be taken to mean a 
principle of evolution and Xie can be interpreted as „design and planning‟, they say. 
Thus, if central and local government recognise the need for and then set up effective 
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institutional arrangements to coordinate their planning and design (the Xie), those 
needs can begin to cohere and form a stable basis for change. Such structural change 
also requires changes in psychological and cultural thinking for both the individual and 
the society. They suggest that He is the necessary evolution of the mind-set (or sets!), 
opening the way to necessary, developmental planning. This may seem, at one level, 
slightly trite but, if it offers a way for bureaucrats to make changes for good, while 
saving „face‟, it cannot be other than a good thing. This is an example where the 
tensions between the national and provincial governments in the PRC can be illustrated 
by the explanatory, „seven forces‟, contextual model proposed by Tseng and Foster 
(2006); regional and national government comprise the sixth and seventh forces in 
their model. 
 
COMMON PROBLEMS AND CONCLUSION 
 
We began by comparing China‟s FDI with that of other key developing countries and 
the rest of the world. It emerges that although China is a big player in aggregate terms 
its per capita position is much less strong. Turning to the distribution of that FDI 
across China the picture is very skewed between the rich East and the rest of the 
country. The fourth section showed how a single policy or action can have very 
differing outcomes in its implementation, sometimes understood and sometimes 
coincidental, including policies specifically aimed at generating growth, for which 
FDI is one key driver. Finally, we highlight some common problems which are 
„annoying grit in the machinery‟ of business life in China, especially irritating from 
the perspective of foreign investors perhaps. First there is the issue of „flexibility‟ 
raised earlier, in the first sub-section of the fourth main section. If regulations or laws 
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are loosely drafted making interpretation inevitable, it can cause two problems. On the 
one hand, one may simply get well intentioned differences of opinion: official A 
thinks this rule/law means X while official B thinks it means Y. Both are trying to be 
honest but the lack of drafting precision means two investors face two different 
effective rules in two different locations.  
 
On the other hand „flexibility‟ can be shorthand for corruption by officials.  For 
example, the young (Chinese) researcher engaged in our Nanjing enquiry, asked the 
local tax bureau there for a definitive breakdown of the tax regime being applied in 
the city and its development zones: the official refused a reply. From an outsider‟s 
perspective the only possible reason for such refusal could be that there was no 
consistent tariff in operation for all the wrong reasons. Another example comes from a 
close, Chinese friend of mine, from Hong Kong, who is a chartered accountant trained 
in the UK. He told me how he would compute his family firm‟s PRC tax liability and 
then go to the tax bureau in Guangdong. The final sum payable was always a matter 
of negotiation, he reports, even if he showed the official whom he met the calculations 
he had prepared, faithfully computed in line with the tax regulations. Another word to 
cover this sort of difficulty is „transparency‟, or the lack of it.   
 
Corruption can of course be even more direct, the pay for a permit syndrome: sadly 
China, like India, is not free of this disease. 
 
Another problem in the transparency mix in China is that regulations can be subject to 
change without notice. For example, November 2006 saw the promulgation of 
guidance on so-called „Regulation 17‟ concerning supplier-retailer contractual links. 
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One of its effects was to say that what had hitherto been lawful and agreed contracts 
were no longer approved and that foreign investors had to renegotiate their supplier 
deals on a basis materially more favourable to the local suppliers. How can one 
sensibly plan for this sort of quixotic regulatory change? 
 
Finally there is the whole issue of IPR. China says it is aware of the problem and is 
committed to dealing with it. However, the problem persists as one understands it. 
 
What the Chinese government, along with many others, sometimes seem to miss is the 
point that companies are not naïve: they don‟t expect to like all regulations (e.g. 
would we not all like income tax to be 1 percent say but we know it has to be much 
more!) but they do want: transparency; that policies be applied consistently over time; 
and honesty. Provinces such as Shanxi might also add pan-country fairness of 
outcome, given their role in the Deng-era of „energy skivvies‟. 
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Appendix 1 – Greater Shanghai-Nanjing Nested Double Diamond 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Firm strategy/structure rivalry 
(2) Demand conditions  
(3) Related and supporting industries 
(4) Factor conditions/infrastructure 
(all interpreted in terms of the „host‟ locations) 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Table of Cumulative FDI in the Defined Regions of China to 2008 
 
 US$bn  US$bn  US$bn  US$bn  
Region Realized 
FDI value 
to 2002 
Share % Realized 
FDI value to 
2004 
Share % Realized 
FDI value to 
2008 
Share % Difference 
2008 less 
2004 
Share % 
East 385.5 86 482.9 86 832.7 83 349.8 78 
Central 39.7 9 52.2 9 116.4 12 64.2 14 
West 22.8 5 26.3 5 58.8 6 32.5 7 
Total 448.0 100 561.4 100 1007.8 100 446.4 99 
 
 
Source: Created by the author: data in this table come from the National China Statistical Yearbook up to 2004; data for 2005-8 are aggregates from 
provincial statistics, because this aggregation is not available in the later National Yearbooks. These later data may be less reliable since provincial 
statistics seem to be subject to „inflation‟, as may be seen by comparing the final column total here with the sum of the annual numbers for 2005 to 
2008 in Table 1. 
 
